Submitted: October 17, 2018
from United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa - Ft. Dodge
WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
BENTON, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Wade Parrish sued jailer Jason D. Dingman, Sheriff Dennis
Hagenson, and Hamilton County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Iowa law. The district court granted qualified immunity to
Dingman and summary judgment to the defendants. Parrish
v. Dingman, 2017 WL 5560280 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 2017).
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court
state trooper stopped Parrish at a checkpoint. After testing
for sobriety and finding marijuana in the vehicle, police
transported him to the Hamilton County Jail. Dingman
conducted the booking procedure.
booking, Parrish told Dingman he had several physical
impairments from breaking his right femur and right arm in a
motorcycle accident five years earlier. Dingman had heard
about the accident and knew Parrish had significant injuries.
Parrish walked with a limp. He told Dingman that he wears
prescription glasses for double vision and special orthotic
shoes because his right leg is shorter than his left. Dingman
let him keep his shoes and glasses in the holding cell.
Parrish also asked for an isolated cell due to his physical
impairments. After completing intake, Dingman gave Parrish a
mattress to make him more comfortable and escorted him to the
male holding cell. During booking and intake, Parrish was
video captured what happened next. Parrish walked through the
cell door holding the mattress in front of his chest. Dingman
was behind him. Seeing another inmate in the cell, Parrish
turned to face Dingman and asked again for an isolated cell.
Dingman shook his head no. Parrish then stepped forward
toward the open cell door "to get the doorway open to
get [Dingman's] answer." The mattress protruded
through the cell door.
believed Parrish was attacking him and trying to leave the
holding cell. He was concerned Parrish could use the mattress
as a shield. Dingman then stepped into the cell, pushed
Parrish into the wall, leveraged him to the floor with his
hands on Parrish's arm and neck, and handcuffed him.
Parrish's right wrist was swollen and bruised from the
handcuffs. He later received chiropractic treatment for lower
back pain and four injured ribs. He also sought mental health
sued Dingman, Hagenson, and Hamilton County under federal and
state law. The officers and the County invoked qualified and
statutory immunity. The district court granted them summary
judgment. Parrish appeals his claims against Dingman for
excessive force and assault and battery, and his claim
against the County for respondeat superior liability.
court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity, "viewing the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor."
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.
2011). Qualified immunity shields Dingman from liability in
this § 1983 action unless Parrish can show: (1) that
Dingman "violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at
the time of the challenged conduct." Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011), quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
excessive-force claim is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. Hicks
v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2011) ("It
is settled in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment's
'objective reasonableness' standard for arrestees
governs excessive-force claims arising during the booking
process."). To prove a constitutional violation, Parrish
must show that Dingman's use of force was not objectively
reasonable under the particular circumstances. Brown v.
City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir.
2009). Objective reasonableness is "judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In determining
objective reasonableness, a court may look to "the
relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit
the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting."
Zubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. ...