Todd E. Lindeman Plaintiff- Appellant
Saint Luke's Hospital of Kansas City Defendant-Appellee
Submitted: April 11, 2018
from United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri - Kansas City
COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
eight years, Todd Lindeman worked in a number of positions
for St. Luke's Hospital of Kansas City. Though much of
that time was uneventful, he quickly progressed through the
stages of St. Luke's disciplinary policy from January to
April 2014. After his fourth infraction, Lindeman was
terminated. Thereafter, he sued St. Luke's, alleging
discrimination in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). St. Luke's filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. Lindeman appeals,
and we affirm.
began working for St. Luke's in 2006 when he was 40 years
old. Although he enjoyed a good employment record for much of
his tenure, this changed when Todd Isbell and Rosa Parodi
became his supervisors at some point in 2013. According to
Lindeman-who suffers from obsessive compulsive disorder,
attention deficit disorder, bipolar disorder, and other
physical limitations-Isbell and Parodi were much more
demanding, and much less pleasant to work with, than his
previous supervisor, Lorra Embers.
Luke's has a progressive discipline system under which an
employee receives a verbal warning for the first infraction,
a written warning for a second infraction, a suspension or
second written warning for a third infraction, and
termination for any subsequent infraction. Further, the
hospital has clear rules prohibiting the dissemination of
confidential patient information, including patient names.
When he began his employment at St. Luke's, Lindeman
received copies of these policies, and the hospital also
periodically conducted additional training sessions on
January 1, 2014, Lindeman received a verbal warning after he
became argumentative when receiving coaching for failing to
answer or return a supervisor's phone calls. Later that
month, Lindeman received a written warning for failing to
abide by the hospital's timecard and call-in procedures
at least five times in two weeks. In late February, Lindeman
received a temporary suspension for failing to call in prior
to missing a scheduled shift. Finally, in April 2014,
Lindeman mentioned the name of a patient to a number of
individuals inside and outside of the St. Luke's
facility, which violated the hospital's confidentiality
policies. This fourth infraction qualified him for
termination, which occurred on April 25, 2014.
then brought this suit against St. Luke's, asserting
claims under the ADA and ADEA. After discovery, St.
Luke's moved for summary judgment, and the district court
granted the motion. Lindeman appeals.
asserts that the district court erred in granting St.
Luke's motion for summary judgment. We "review de
novo a grant of summary judgment," Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc), "viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to [Lindeman], the
nonmoving party." Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac.
Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2010). We will affirm
if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Specifically, Lindeman argues
on appeal that he has shown that St. Luke's reason for
his termination is pretext for intentional disability
discrimination and that he exhausted his administrative
remedies on his failure-to-accommodate claim. We address each
prohibits discrimination "on the basis of
disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). When presented
only with circumstantial evidence, we analyze ADA claims
under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d
963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014). To survive a motion for summary
judgment under this analysis, the employee has "the
initial burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination." McNary v. Schreiber Foods,
Inc., 535 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the
employer "to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, "the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's
proffered reason is merely a pretext for intentional
discrimination." Prod. Fabricators, 763 F.3d at
969. Here, on summary judgment and on appeal, the parties
have assumed that Lindeman can establish his prima facie
case. Further, St. Luke's proffered reason for
Lindeman's termination-disclosure of confidential
information in violation of hospital policies-is a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. See Twymon v. Wells Fargo ...