from the District Court of Morton County, South Central
Judicial District, the Honorable David E. Reich, Judge.
Allen Kautzman, J.B.K., and B.M.K., petitioners; no
R. Harris, Mandan, N.D., for respondent and appellant.
1] Brenda Doll appeals from a district court order denying
her motion for reconsideration of a disorderly conduct
restraining order. We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Doll's motion for
reconsideration. We affirm.
2] On November 7, 2016, Bruce Kautzman filed a petition for a
disorderly conduct restraining order against Doll. The
district court granted a temporary disorderly conduct
restraining order and set a hearing for November 17, 2016.
The parties stipulated to rescheduling the hearing.
3] The district court held a hearing on December 16, 2016 and
granted the disorderly conduct restraining order. On March 7,
2017, Doll filed a motion for reconsideration. On April 25,
2017, the court filed an order denying the motion for
reconsideration. On June 23, 2017, Doll filed her notice of
4] Doll argues the district court abused its discretion by
issuing a temporary restraining order, misapplying the law in
issuing a permanent restraining order, and not giving her
motion for reconsideration due consideration. Doll also
argues the court erred in denying her a full and fair
5] Doll appeals only from the district court order denying
her motion to reconsider. She did not appeal from the
November 8, 2016 temporary restraining order, nor the
December 16, 2016 disorderly conduct restraining order.
"An appeal from a [district] court's refusal to
vacate an order under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., does not
permit the appellant to attack the underlying order from
which an appeal could have been, but was not, brought."
Anderson v. Baker, 2015 ND 269, ¶ 8, 871 N.W.2d
830 (quoting Sturdevant v. SAE Warehouse, Inc., 310
N.W.2d 749, 752 (N.D. 1981)). Because the November 8, 2016
temporary disorderly conduct restraining order and the
December 16, 2016 disorderly conduct restraining order were
not appealed, Doll cannot challenge whether the orders were
appropriate. Doll's attempt to raise issues decided by
the 2016 orders is also improper because the time for appeal
from those orders was not tolled by her motion for
reconsideration and, consequently, an appeal from the
November 8, 2016 and December 16, 2016 orders is untimely.
6] "Before we consider the merits of an appeal, we must
have jurisdiction." Choice Fin. Grp. v.
Schellpfeffer, 2005 ND 90, ¶ 6, 696 N.W.2d 504.
This Court's jurisdiction is provided by the filing of a
timely notice of appeal. Under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a)(1), a notice
of appeal must be filed "within 60 days from service of
notice of entry of the judgment or order being
appealed." Doll's time for a direct appeal from the
disorderly conduct restraining order lapsed before she filed
her motion for reconsideration.
7] Rule 4(a)(3)(A), N.D.R.App.P., states:
If a party timely files with the clerk of district court any
of the following motions under the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure, however titled, the full time to file an
appeal runs for all parties from service of notice of the