from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central
Judicial District, the Honorable John W. Grinsteiner, Judge.
Michael R. Hoffman, for appellant.
Moraghan, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
VandeWalle, Chief Justice.
1] Ryan Crawford appealed from a district court judgment
affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending
his driving privileges for two years. Crawford argues (1) the
arresting officer did not have grounds to initially stop his
vehicle, and (2) the results of a warrantless blood test
should not have been admitted into evidence in the license
suspension proceeding. We conclude the arresting officer had
a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially stop
Crawford's vehicle. We also conclude that assuming
Crawford's consent to the warrantless blood test was
involuntary for purposes of this appeal, the exclusionary
rule does not require suppression of the results of the blood
test in this civil administrative license suspension
proceeding under Beylund v. Levi, 2017 ND 30, 889
N.W.2d 907. We affirm.
2] According to the arresting officer, he stopped a vehicle
driven by Crawford for swerving over a centerline on a
residential street in Bismarck in January 2016, and
ultimately arrested Crawford for driving under the influence.
After the officer read Crawford the implied consent advisory,
Crawford submitted to a warrantless blood test incident to
the arrest, and the result of that test indicated a blood
alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Crawford
requested an administrative hearing on the Department's
intended suspension of his license but did not testify at the
hearing. After the administrative hearing, the Department
suspended Crawford's driving privileges for two years.
The district court affirmed the Department's decision.
3] The Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch.
28-32, governs our review of an administrative decision
suspending or revoking a driver's license. E.g.,
Koehly v. Levi, 2016 ND 202, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d
689. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49, we review an
administrative appeal from a district court judgment in the
same manner as provided under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46, which
requires a district court to affirm an agency order unless
the order is not in accordance with the law, the order
violates the constitutional rights of the appellant, the
provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 have not been complied with
in the proceedings before the agency, the agency's rules
or procedure have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing,
the agency's findings of fact are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, the agency's conclusions
of law and order are not supported by its findings of fact,
or the agency's findings of fact do not sufficiently
address the evidence presented by the appellant.
Koehly, at ¶ 15.
4] In reviewing an agency's findings of fact, we do not
make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment
for that of the agency; rather, we determine only whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the
agency's findings were supported by the weight of the
evidence from the entire record. Power Fuels, Inc. v.
Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D. 1979). We defer to the
agency's opportunity to judge witnesses' credibility.
Koehly, 2016 ND 202, ¶ 16, 886 N.W.2d 689. Once
the facts are established, their significance presents a
question of law, which we review de novo. Bell v. N.D.
Dep't of Transp., 2012 ND 102, ¶ 20, 816 N.W.2d
786. We review claimed violations of constitutional rights de
novo. Martin v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND
181, ¶ 5, 773 N.W.2d 190.
5] Crawford argues the Department should not have suspended
his license because the arresting officer did not have a
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initially stop his
vehicle. He claims a review of the officer's video of the
stop establishes Crawford "twice slightly moving left in
his vehicle as he is driving, but it does not show him
hitting the center line even once." Crawford argues the
hearing officer's finding of fact that he hit the center
dividing line is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Department responds that based on the evidence
presented at the administrative hearing, a reasoning mind
reasonably could have concluded the arresting officer
observed Crawford's vehicle swerve left over the
centerline and the officer thus had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to initially stop Crawford's
vehicle for a traffic violation.
6] "'[T]raffic violations, even if considered common
or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and, therefore,
provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting
investigatory stops.'" State v. Fields,
2003 ND 81, ¶ 7, 662 N.W.2d 242 (quoting State v.
Storbakken, 552 N.W.2d 78, 80-81 (N.D. 1996)).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996) (law enforcement officer's decision to
initially stop an automobile is reasonable when the officer
has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
7] Although Crawford claims a video of the traffic stop shows
he did not cross or hit the center dividing line of the
street even once, the arresting officer testified at the
administrative hearing that he observed Crawford's
vehicle cross the centerline of the street. Our review of the
video of the traffic stop does not contradict the arresting
officer's testimony, and we do not reweigh that evidence
or reassess the arresting officer's credibility. A
reasoning mind could reasonably conclude the police officer
observed Crawford's vehicle crossing the centerline,
which supports the conclusion the officer had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to initially stop Crawford's
vehicle for a traffic violation. See N.D.C.C.
§§ 39-10-01.1 and 39-10-08(1) (subject to
exceptions not applicable ...