United States District Court, D. North Dakota
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Charles S. Miller, Jr., Magistrate Judge
plaintiff, Robert Mugabe ("Mugabe"), initiated the
above-entitled action pro se by complaint on June
29, 2016. He filed his consent to the undersigned's
exercise of jurisdiction over this matter on July 12, 2016.
(Docket No. 5). What follows is the undersigned's
pre-service review of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is
seeking reinstatement of unemployment benefits that he
asserts were wrongly denied him by Job Service North Dakota.
His complaint alleges:
My complaints are: my benefit was dinied from them for no
reason that why I ask district court can help me process my
case. They can help me review my case.
* * *
the amounts are 3, 000 Since last year: 2015 was stopping my
benefit for no reason. I ask the district court to help me
get back my benefit, was denied with Job Service ND
(Docket No. 4) (errors in original). As the basis for this
court's exercise of jurisdiction, he "checks the
box" next to federal question on his form complaint and
then states: "the issue is Job Service ND was denied my
claim they stopping my benefit for no reason: while I am
eligible for benefit." (Id.).
Standard of Review
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides that, notwithstanding
financial eligibility, "the court shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that . . . the action (I)
is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief." In
applying the provisions of § 1915(e)(2), the court must
give the pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal
construction and not dismiss the complaint unless it is clear
beyond doubt that there is no set of facts that would entitle
the plaintiff to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (pro se complaints are "subject
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers"); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127,
1128-29 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2) (requiring that a claim for relief contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief[.]"); Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (directing that
pro se complaints be liberally construed but with
the caveat that courts "will not supply additional
facts, nor . . . construct a legal theory for plaintiff that
assumes facts that have not been pleaded.").
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). Consequently, this court can only exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,
" 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or civil actions wherein there
is diversity of citizenship between parties and the matter in
controversy exceeds $75, 000.00, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. And
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish the existence
of federal jurisdiction. Id., see also McCracken
v. Conoco Phillips Co., 335 F.App'x 161, 162-163 (3d
Mugabe has failed to identify any federal statute or
Constitutional right allegedly violated by defendants. Even
if Mugabe's complaint could somehow be construed to raise
a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it
lacks any factual allegations suggesting what constitutional
right was allegedly violated. To state a cognizable claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must normally allege a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws
of the United States and that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Walker
v. Reed, 104 F.3d 156, 157 (8th Cir. 1997). Even under
liberal pleading standards, a pro se litigant, at
the very least, must invoke rights under the Constitution or