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SNYDER v. BETTMAN

June 1, 1903

SNYDER
v.
BETTMAN



ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, Holmes, Day

Author: Brown

[ 190 U.S. Page 250]

 MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case involves the single question whether it is within the power of the Federal government, and within the spirit of the act of Congress of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, as amended March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 946, to impose a succession tax upon a bequest to a municipal corporation of a State for a corporate and public purpose.

The case is to a certain extent the converse of those of the United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, and Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115. In the first of these we held it to be within the competency of the State of New York to impose a similar tax upon a bequest to the Federal government, incidentally deciding (1) that the inheritance tax of the State was "in reality a limitation upon the power of a testator to bequeath his property to whom he pleases; a declaration that, in the exercise of that power, he shall contribute a certain percentage for the public use;" and (2) that the tax was not a tax upon the property itself, but upon its transmission by will or descent. In Plummer v. Coler we held the incidental fact that the property bequeathed is composed in whole or in part of Federal securities, did not invalidate the state tax or the law under which it was imposed, although it was accepted as undeniable that the State could not, in the exercise of the power of taxation, tax obligations of the United States, and, correlatively, that bonds issued by a State, or under its authority by its municipal bodies, were not taxable by the United States.

It is insisted, however, that the case under consideration is distinguished from those above cited, in the fact that the inheritance tax of New York was but a condition annexed to the power of a testator to dispose of his property by will, and

[ 190 U.S. Page 251]

     that such power, being purely statutory, the State has the right to annex such conditions to it as it pleases. The case, then, really resolves itself into the question whether the authority to lay a succession tax arises solely from the power to regulate the descent of property, or, as well from the independent general power to tax, or, as expressed in the Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises." The difficulty with this proposition of the plaintiff is that it proves too much. If it be true that the right to impose such taxes arises solely from the right to regulate successions, then a denial of such right goes to the whole power of the government to impose a succession tax, irrespective of the question whether the legacy is made to a private individual or to an agent of the State, and the cases in this court upholding the power of the Federal government to lay such tax were wrongly decided.

That question was exhaustively considered by this court in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, in which the constitutionality of this law was attacked upon four grounds: (1) That the taxes imposed were direct taxes, and not apportioned according to the population; (2) if not direct, they were levied on rights created solely by a state law, depending for their continued existence on the consent of the several States; (3) because they were not uniform throughout the United States; (4) that the rate of tax was determined by the aggregate amount of the personal estate of the deceased, and not by the sum of the legacies or distributive shares. It was held, following the cases of United States v. Parkins, 163 U.S. 625, and Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, that an inheritance tax was not one upon property but upon the succession. The question involved here, as to the power of Congress to levy a succession tax, was considered, and it was said by Mr. Justice White (p. 56): "The proposition that it cannot rests upon the assumption that, since the transmission of property by death is exclusively subject to the regulating authority of the several States, therefore the levy by Congress of a tax on inheritances or legacies, in any form, is beyond the power of Congress, and is an interference by the national government

[ 190 U.S. Page 252]

     with a matter which falls alone within the reach of state legislation." This proposition was pronounced a fallacy (p. 59): "In legal effect, then, the proposition upon which the argument rests is that wherever a right is subject to exclusive regulation, by either the government of the United States on the one hand or the several States on the other, the exercise of such rights as regulated can alone be taxed by the government having the mission to regulate." In this connection was cited the power of the States to tax imported goods after they had been commingled with the general property of the State, as well as vehicles engaged in interstate commerce.

Continuing, it was further said (page 60): "It cannot be doubted that the argument when reduced to its essence, demonstrates its own unsoundness, since it leads to the necessary conclusion that both the national and state governments are divested of those powers of taxation which from the foundation of the government admittedly have belonged to them. . . . Under our constitutional system both the national and the state governments, moving in their respective orbits, have a common authority to tax many and diverse objects, but this does not cause the exercise of its lawful attributes by one to be a curtailment of the powers of government of the other, for if it did there would practically be an end of the dual system of government which the Constitution established."

This case must be regarded as definitely establishing the doctrine that the power to tax inheritances does not arise solely from the power to regulate the descent of property, but from the general authority to impose taxes upon all property within the jurisdiction of the taxing power. It has usually happened that the power has been exercised by the same government which regulates the succession to the property taxed; but this power is not destroyed by the dual character of our government, or by the fact that under our Constitution the devolution of property is determined by the laws of the several States.

The principles laid down in Knowlton v. Moore were reiterated in Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, although the case was decided upon ...


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